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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF VI Ml 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
v. 
BRENT MAUCHLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010551-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
ARGUMENT 
THERE IS A DISTINCT TREND TOWARDS 
TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD 
Defendant claims that the trend towards the trustworthiness standard has little 
momentum because some of the jurisdictions that have adopted the standard still require 
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defendant's claim, however Jurisdictions that apply the trustworthiness standard do not 
continue to require independent evidence of a crime. 
For example, in State ^ > Hafford, / 46 i \ 2d 150, 1 73 (Conn. 2000),, the Connecticut 
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independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti." Connecticut follows the 
trustworthiness standard because it "eliminate^] the complexities and difficulties 
attendant upon the application of the corpus delicti rule requiring independent 
corroborating evidence of all the elements of a crime before an accused's statements may 
be admitted into evidence." Id. at 174. The prosecution in Hafford had introduced some 
independent evidence that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. Id. at 174. This 
evidence corroborated, and therefore "supported] the trustworthiness of the defendant's 
confession." Id. Independent evidence of the crime, if available, will often demonstrate 
the trustworthiness of the confession. See id. Nevertheless, independent evidence of the 
corpus delicti is not required before a trustworthy confession can be admitted. Id. at 173. 
Likewise, in State v. Zysk, 465 A.2d 480, 484 (N.H. 1983), the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court held that "[p]roof of the crime by evidence independent of the confession 
is not necessary," although the prosecution had introduced evidence to show that a 
burglary occurred. Similarly, in Reynolds v. State, 309 S.E.2d 867, 868 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1983), the prosecution produced independent evidence of the crime. Nevertheless, that 
evidence was not necessary because the rule in Georgia is that a confession is admissible 
when it is "corroborated] in any material particular." Id. 
Defendant claims that the Ninth and Tenth Circuits also require the prosecution to 
demonstrate that a crime has occurred before a confession is admissible. Br. of Resp. at 
17-18. The rule in the federal courts, however, was announced by the United States 
Supreme Court in Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93 (1954). That rule rejects the 
requirement that independent evidence establish the corpus delicti before a confession can 
be admitted. Id. The Tenth Circuit has recognized that "Opper rejected a view which had 
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earlier been the rule in many jurisdiction and was deeply rooted in the common law that 
independent evidence was required to corroborate the corpus delicti." United States v. 
Wiseman, 172 F.3d 1196, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999). The Ninth Circuit has also recognized 
that "Opper 'rejected the traditional corpus delicti rule.'" United States v. Corona-
Garcia, 210 F.3d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 2000). 
Following the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Opper, at least sixteen 
states, plus the District of Columbia, have adopted some form of the trustworthiness 
standard. Br. of Pet. at 8-11. Of these seventeen jurisdictions, at least twelve of them 
have completely abandoned the corpus delicti rule and do not require independent proof 
that a crime was committed. Id. at 8-10.1 There is also additional evidence, beyond that 
cited in the State's opening brief, of the trend towards the trustworthiness standard. For 
example, although Florida follows the corpus delicti rule, two judges of the Florida 
District Court of Appeal recently urged the Florida Supreme Court to abandon the corpus 
delicti rule and adopt the trustworthiness standard in attempt and conspiracy cases. 
Carwise v. State, No. 5D00-2828, 2002 WL 312513, at *1 - *3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(Harris, J., concurring specially; Sharp, W., J., dissenting). The court also noted in 
1
 In its opening brief the State classified Texas as completely abandoning the 
corpus delicti rule. However, in Chavero v. State, 36 S.W.3d 688, 696 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2001), the Texas Court of Appeals applied the corpus delicti rule. Nevertheless, under 
Texas statute a defendant's oral statement is admissible if, at the time it was made, it 
"contained assertions unknown by law enforcement but later corroborated." Moore v. 
State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 400 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, while Texas may not have 
completely abandoned the corpus delicti rule, it has embraced some aspects of the 
trustworthiness approach by statute. 
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Carwise that the Florida Legislature had recently adopted the trustworthiness standard for 
cases involving sexual abuse and unauthorized money transmission. Id. at *3 n.2; FLA. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 92.565 and 560.125(8) (West 2002). Accordingly, there is a distinct trend 
toward the trustworthiness standard and away from the corpus delicti rule. 
II. THE TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD PROVIDES THE 
BETTER METHOD FOR DETERMINING THE 
RELIABILITY OF CONFESSIONS AND ENHANCING THE 
TRUTHFINDING PURPOSE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS 
Defendant touts the corpus delicti rule as a safeguard to prevent the admission of 
false confessions. Br. of Resp. at 12-15. He overestimates the rule's utility, however. 
The corpus delicti rule is not an effective safeguard against false confessions 
because it judges the admissibility of a confession without regard for the substance of the 
confession. See People v. McMahan, 548 N.W.2d 199, 206 (Mich. 1996) (Boyle, J., 
dissenting). Rather than evaluating the confession itself, the rule requires only that the 
prosecution establish independent evidence that a crime was committed by someone. 
State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162 (Utah 1991). 
By ignoring the substance of the confession, the corpus delicti rule does little to 
prevent the admission of false confessions. It is not difficult to imagine a scenario where 
the police have independent evidence of a crime, and yet obtain a false, but voluntary 
confession from an innocent individual. It is also conceivable that a dishonest police 
officer, a self-interested accomplice, or a malicious enemy might seek to frame an 
innocent defendant by fabricating a story that the defendant confessed to committing an 
actual crime. See McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 207 n. 11. The corpus delicti rule would 
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allow these false confessions to be admitted without regard for their reliability, simply 
because independent evidence of the crime existed. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162. 
Conversely, the trustworthiness approach puts the substance of the confession 
squarely at issue and ensures that a particular statement is sufficiently reliable for the 
factfinder to hear it. See McMahan, 548 N.W.2d at 206. The trustworthiness approach 
requires the prosecution to introduce "substantial independent evidence" to corroborate 
"the essential facts admitted sufficiently to justify a jury inference of their truth." Opper, 
348 U.S. at 93. If the goal is to prevent the admission of false confessions, the more 
effective approach is to examine the trustworthiness of the confession, not simply 
whether independent evidence demonstrates that someone committed a crime. Thus, the 
trustworthiness approach provides the better method for preventing the admission of false 
confessions because it ensures that a confession is reliable before it is admitted. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the superiority of the 
trustworthiness standard as a means to determine the reliability and admissibility of 
confessions. See Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153-156(1954). In Smith, the 
Court was well-aware of the problem of false confessions. See id. at 153. Yet, it adopted 
the trustworthiness approach, rather than the corpus delicti rule, as the method for 
determining the reliability and admissibility of a confession. See id. at 153, 156. 
Besides better ensuring the reliability of a confession, the trustworthiness approach 
also increases the factfinder's ability to ascertain truth by allowing a reliable confession to 
be admitted, even when independent evidence of a crime is lacking. Defendant claims 
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that only a "remote" possibility exists that a case may arise in which "some evidence 
corroborates a confession but the State does not have enough evidence to show that a 
crime actually occurred." Br. of Resp. at 24-25. This case, however, demonstrates that 
such cases do arise. It is undisputed that defendant's confession was truthful and 
voluntary. Yet, under the corpus delicti rule, the State cannot prosecute defendant for a 
crime he admits having committed. See State v. Mauchley, 2001 UT App 177, %l. 
It is not difficult to conceive of future cases where the corpus delicti rule will 
continue to hinder the fact finder's ability to ascertain truth. For example, although a 
defendant may truthfully and voluntarily confess to sexually abusing a child, the corpus 
delicti rule would prevent the fact finder from hearing the confession if no physical 
evidence of the abuse existed and the victim was either too young or too scared to testify. 
See State v. Ray, 926 P.2d 904 (Wash. 1996). Likewise, the fact finder would not hear 
the truthful and voluntary confession of a murderer who smothers a newborn baby if the 
medical examiner could not rule out the possibility that the death may have resulted from 
natural causes. See State v. Johnson, 83 P.2d 1010, 1014-18, 1016 (Utah 1943). Thus, 
there is a significant likelihood that the corpus delicti rule will continue to thwart the 
truthfinding purpose of criminal trials by preventing the trier of fact from considering a 
trustworthy and voluntary confession. See Ray, 926 P.2d at 910-11 (Talmadge, J., 
dissenting). The trustworthiness approach avoids this result. See id. 
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III. THE TRUSTWORTHINESS STANDARD IS CLEAR AND 
EASILY APPLIED 
Defendant complains that the trustworthiness standard is vague because it does not 
define "how much and what kind of evidence is needed to satisfy its requirements." Br. 
of Resp. at 25 (internal quotations and citation omitted). On the contrary, the United 
States Supreme Court has clearly defined the standard. See Opper, 348 U.S. at 93. The 
kind of evidence needed to satisfy the standard is evidence that corroborates the essential 
facts of the confession. Id. The amount of corroborative evidence required is 
"substantial" evidence "sufficient[] to justify a jury inference" that the essential facts of 
the confession are true. Id. The independent evidence need not corroborate each material 
element of the charged offense, nor is it necessary that there be no inconsistencies 
whatsoever between the independent evidence and the confession. Fontenot v. State, 881 
P.2d 69, 79 (Okla Crim. App. 1994). "Unless inconsistencies between the confession and 
the other evidence so overwhelm the similarities that the confession is rendered 
untrustworthy, it remains within the province of the jury to determine whether the 
confession is credible." Id. 
This Court is familiar with the trustworthiness standard and has readily applied it 
in determining the admissibility of a defendant's confession. For example, in State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, f 78, 993 P.2d 837, this Court held that the defendant's confession 
to a fellow inmate was "sufficiently corroborated to make it reliable" and therefore 
admissible. In Decorso, the independent evidence corroborated defendant's confession 
that he had robbed a shoe store, struggled with the clerk, taped her mouth shut, hit her in 
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the mouth with the butt of a gun, broke her teeth, and murdered her by stabbing her 
several times in the neck and chest. Id. at ffi[76-78. The defendant argued that certain 
aspects of his confession were not corroborated by independent evidence, specifically, his 
admissions that he did not go to work after the murder, and that he raped the victim. Id. 
at H 77. Nevertheless, this Court held that the confession was reliable because it was 
"sufficiently corroborated." Id. at 78. Thus, as this Court demonstrated in Decorso, the 
trustworthiness standard is not vague or difficult to apply. 
IV. DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION WAS TRUSTWORTHY 
Defendant complains that there is a "total lack" of evidence corroborating his 
confession. Br. of Resp. at 26. On the contrary, the independent evidence corroborated 
every detail of defendant's confession, except for the fact that a crime had been 
committed. R. 37-38. 
Defendant states that "all the evidence, excluding the confession," indicates that 
his insurance claim was valid. Br. of Resp. at 27. Thus, defendant essentially claims that 
his confession was not trustworthy because the State failed to produce independent, 
corroborating evidence that he committed insurance fraud by submitting a fraudulent 
claim. The State does not dispute that it lacks independent evidence that defendant's 
insurance claim was fraudulent. If such independent evidence existed, the State could 
have satisfied the corpus delicti rule. See Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1162. 
Under the trustworthiness standard, however, the independent evidence need not 
be sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the underlying crime. Opper, 348 U.S. at 
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93. In this case, the independent evidence corroborated defendant's confession that he 
and his wife obtained an insurance settlement by claiming that they had fallen into a hole 
outside the FHP hospital in South Salt Lake. R. 37-38. Defendant fails to identify any 
inconsistency between his confession and the independent evidence. Therefore, 
defendant's confession was trustworthy and admissible under the trustworthiness 
standard. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those explained in the State's opening brief, this 
Court should adopt the trustworthiness standard, reverse the court of appeals, and affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted this <v day of July 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
CHRISTOPHER D. BALLARD 
Assistant Attorney General 
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